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 Privatisation of British Train Operations: 
 
the decline and derailment of the Great North Eastern Railway. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
As a result of the 1993 Railways Act, the British railways industry was privatised 
which resulted in the separation of ownership and control of the railway infrastructure 
(track, signals and stations) from that of passenger train operations. The Great North 
Eastern Railway (GNER), a major train operator, was unable to meet its contractual 
obligations shortly after successfully re-tendering for its second franchise. Within the 
context of incomplete contract theory, this paper discusses the main problems 
inherent in the franchising process and which specifically contributed to the collapse 
of GNER.  In particular, the paper argues that the fragmented structure of asset 
ownership, the lack of coordination and investment incentives and flaws in the 
franchise method itself explain the demise of GNER and have undermined the general 
objectives of railway privatisation.    
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Privatisation of British Train Operations: 
 
the decline and derailment of the Great North Eastern Railway. 
 
 
 
 “…the passenger rail franchising system (is) a self-contradictory muddle, 
providing no coherent framework or vision for the development of passenger 
services for future generations. The result is a system that is worth less, and 
costs more, than the sum of its parts.” 
 
Passenger Rail Franchising, 14th Report of Session 2005/6,    
House of Commons, 1534,   November 5th 2006, para 15.                                                    
 
                                                                                                                                                    
The government set out its proposals for restructuring and privatising the UK’s 
railway industry in a governmental ‘White Paper1’ – which were subsequently 
enacted into legislation in the Railways Act 1993.  
 
In 1996, the UK government commenced the privatisation process of the UK railway 
industry. As a result of this process, the government fragmented the former state 
owned and integrated rail industry into two key segments: firstly, track, signalling and 
station infrastructure; and secondly, the train operating companies.  One of these 
major train operating companies was the Great North Eastern Railway Ltd (GNER) 
which mainly operated a prime arterial route from London to Scotland. GNER 
commenced its first franchised operations in May 1996 and later successfully 
achieved a renewal of its franchise in 2005. 
 
However, during the period of its first franchise, GNER received a substantial 
revenue subsidy from the government. In contrast, during GNER’s second franchise, 
the train operator agreed to pay a significant premium to the government. During only 
the second year of the franchise, GNER ran into major financial difficulties which 
ultimately resulted in the termination of its franchise. Why did the expected benefits 
of fragmentation and franchising not materialise? What went wrong? Do the 
fragmentation of the railway and the incentives provided in the contract explain why 
the GNER franchise was not viable?  What was overlooked by the government and 
regulators?  
 
The paper aims to address these questions applying incomplete contract theory and 
therefore, by providing a different perspective of the problem, it extends and 
complements the analysis resulting from basic financial indicators. We believe that 
this mixed approach is in itself novel and important for both research and accounting 
practice because it helps to deepen  the understanding of the causes of financial 
failures.  In particular, we discuss how the weaknesses and limitations of the GNER 
franchise2  are the result of the lack of coordination and investment incentives in the 
                                                     
1 See Department of Transport (DoT, ‘White Paper’), ‘New Opportunities for the Railways’, 
July 1992. 
2 It is not the objective of this paper to suggest how franchised contracts should be stipulated 
and implemented.  This is outside the scope of this paper. 
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fragmented rail system.  We also examine the extent that private self interest deviated 
from the public interest and the government’s position as the rail ‘operator of last 
resort’ in order to ensure continuity of public transport. All these issues have 
undermined the main objectives of the railway privatisation i.e. no substantial 
improvement passenger services and generous subsidies have not allowed the transfer 
risk to the private sector.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 1 briefly examines some economic aspects 
regarding franchises and competition, and then, analyses the problems that might 
arise in franchise contracts from the perspective of incomplete contract theory.      
With this framework in mind, section 2 evaluates the franchising method for train 
operations.  Section 3 focuses particularly on the franchise awarded to GNER.  
Finally, Section 4 draws inferences from the collapse of GNER. 
 
 
1. Franchises, Competition, Incentives and Incomplete Contracts 
 
Before considering the theoretical framework within which the issues generated by 
UK rail privatisation can be evaluated, it is important to highlight that “successful 
utility network privatisation requires incentive based regulation that allows 
investment to be adequately rewarded from unsubsidised revenues while maintaining 
quality, and restructuring that permits effective competition for the network service.” 
(Newbery, 2004, abstract) 
 
Network utilities such as electricity, gas and railway are generally regarded as 
‘natural’ monopolies characterised by predominantly substantial sunk investments. 
These utilities usually deliver essential services to consumers. The traditional conflict 
between consumers (seeking to pay low prices) and investors (wanting to reap profits) 
has frequently led to demands for public ownership (access to state investment and 
control over final prices).  But the perceived political problems of keeping consumer 
prices low, the high cost of service provision, demands for expanding public funding 
and a lack of investment has led to increased demand for privatisation.  In order to 
avoid transforming public monopolies into private monopolies, privatisation has been 
frequently accompanied with restructuring to increase competition. A way of 
achieving this goal has been to separate ownership of the utility infrastructure 
networks from that of the ownership of the companies providing the network 
services. 
 
1.1. Franchising and Competition 
 
Conventionally, franchising has often been used to describe different forms of 
business operations such as licensing distribution and other agency arrangements.  
For example, in the case of the British railway network, the 1993 Railways Act 
(sec.6) makes it illegal to operate a railway asset without a licence. 
 
The rail infrastructure company, Network Rail (formerly  Railtrack3) owns, controls 
and mantains the rail infrastructure (tracks, signalling, stations4) and  three private 
                                                     
3 On the application of the Secretary of State for Transport, the High Court placed Railtrack 
plc into Railway Administration in October 2001. The administration process has a number 
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sector leasing companies (rolling stock companies - ROSCOs) own the rolling stock.   
The Office of Passanger Rail Franchising5 (OPRAF),  an independent regulatory 
body created by the 1993 Railways Act, was the inital franchisor and worked closely 
with the train operators and infrastructure company. OPRAF decided the train paths, 
set the minium level of passanger service requirement (frequency, duration and 
departure of the journeys) and invited bids in terms of subsidy (or premiums) that the 
operators required to provide the service.  The train operating companies  (TOCs)  are 
the franchisees  and initially were allocated franchises for 25 (28 by 2006) specified 
routes based   largely on  geographic considerations typically for 7-10 years.. Their 
major costs are payments for track access charges (TACs) to Network Rail, leasing 
payments to ROSCOs and their own operating expenditure (labour costs, fuel, etc.).   
 
The concept of separating ownership of the network infrastructure from that of the 
network operators was indeed to fragment the utility and remove (at least)  some of 
its power by allowing entrants (via competitive tendering) to use the network and to  
provide improved services for consumers.  That is,  
 “…contracting out is the element of ex ante competition – competition for the 
market as opposed to competition in it.”   (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p 67).  
 
Early support for the franchising model came from Chadwick (1859), later supported 
by Demsetz (1968) who believed that franchising was a solution to problems of 
natural monopolies. In particular, Demsetz believed that competitive bidding for a 
franchising scheme was useful where it is not possible to rely on potential 
competition to exert discipline on a ‘natural monopolist’s pricing.’  This situation is 
likely to arise when there are substantial barriers that impede new firms from entering 
an industry Dnes (1995). 
 
Traditionally, competitive bidding allows the selection of operators with the lowest 
estimated service price (after covering costs) at the time of tendering.   As the number 
of potential bidders increases, the benefits of the auction also increase because it puts 
further pressure on the lowering of prices which facilitates competitive outcomes.    
Franchising can be viewed as introducing elements of ‘market contestability’, in the 
sense that although franchising grants monopoly rights to one supplier, it is temporary 
in nature, so the supplier could be displaced by another more efficient one that 
charges lower prices.  Ultimately, the contractual sanction for underperformance is 
franchise termination and competitive bidding provides incentives to achieve 
production efficiency.  It is largely for these reasons that franchises have often been 
                                                                                                                                                       
of similarities to the Chapter 11 provisions (for companies experiencing solvency difficulties) 
in the USA. As part of the reconstruction, its parent company, Railtrack Group plc sold 
Railtrack’s plc’s infrastructure assets to a specially created ‘not for dividend company’ called 
Network Rail Ltd (See Network Rail,2003). This new company started trading on 3rd 
October 2002. Throughout this paper the infrastructure company will be referred to as 
Network Rail when appropriate. 
4 In practice, the infrastructure company leased many of the smaller and medium sized 
railway stations back to the train operating companies. 
5 In 2002, OPRAF was replaced by the Strategic Rail Authority (created under the Transport 
Act 2000) which was also to determine the allocation of public funding and the strategic 
direction of the overall railway industry.  In 2005, the SRA was abolished and many of its 
responsibilities for TOC franchises and regulation returned to state control though the 
Department of Transport. 
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considered to have an advantage over traditional regulation and nationalisation (See 
Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Domberger, 1986; Pirie 1988).     
 
Furthermore, Newbery (2004, p.12) emphasised that the benefits from vertical 
business fragmentation and contracting out would be larger when “…the synergies 
between network and services are low, and there is excess capacity in service 
provision, with few economies of scale.  In this case it is possible to create a 
sufficient number of competing service companies while the spare capacity restricts 
their ability to raise prices above costs if there are low economies of scope between 
the network and network services.”   
 
Besides the above considerations, succesful franchising depends largely on the 
contract design, monitoring and enforcement.  These aspects, that will be discussed 
next, will influence the behaviour of the contractual parties (Klein, 1995). 
 
1.2. Contractual Difficulties 
 
Train operating companies aim is to be awarded franchises by competitive tendering. 
Successful tenders will grant the winner the right to maximise profits through rights 
to use the rail infrastructure in exchange for providing a minimum required service to 
the passengers with the lowest state subsidy or the highest premium.  The franchisor’s 
main aim is to protect the interest of passengers (i.e. guarantee a minimum level of 
service) and taxpayers.   After the contract is struck, the franchisee (i.e. the agent) 
must make decisions on how to achieve quality service given the rail infrastructure 
and the available rolling stock (neither of which are under the ownership of the 
franchisee).  The state, acting as the franchisor, (i.e. the principal) has devolved its 
responsibility to statuary established   independent regulators to monitor and enforce 
the attainment of quality.  Franchising can be viewed as a way of sharing risks and 
lifting the franchisee’s resource constraints (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; 
Lafontaine, 1992).   But in a world where the agent’s efforts are not always verifiable, 
this typically leads to potential agency problems like ‘moral hazard’, ‘free riding’,  
‘inefficient investment’,  etc. (Grossman and Hart, 1983).   
 
One way to resolve these potential problems is to formulate a contract specifying all 
possible decisions and therefore, the principal provides all the incentives to make the 
agent perform in the way the principal.  However, in this ‘complete’ contract, 
monitoring and enforcing the contract becomes extremely costly and difficult (if not 
impossible) in a world of uncertainty and risk which leads to ‘incomplete’ contracts 
(see Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Williamson, 1981, 1985). Furthermore, is it 
possible to devise out a ‘complete’ contract?  That is a contract that (optimally) 
specifies the rights and responsibilities of all parties in every future state of the world 
and hence, takes into consideration all future contingencies and rules out contract 
renegotiation.  Even in the case of no information asymmetry, contracts are 
incomplete and organisational forms (i.e. boundaries of the parties) are important in 
determining agent’s incentives (Hart 2003).  
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These ‘incomplete contracts’6 arise because of the impossibility to account, ex-ante, 
for all unforeseen events. Even if it were possible to account for all contingencies, the 
cost of identifying all of them in the contract will be excessively costly; the contract 
will become too complex to be understood; and hence verification and contract 
enforcement will be impossible.   Indeed, a contract “is incomplete if the parties 
would prefer to add contingent clauses, but are prevented from doing so by the fact 
that the state of nature cannot be verified (or because states are too expensive to 
describe ex ante)” (Hart and Moore, 1999:134).  That is, ultimately, transaction costs 
prevent writing out complete contracts and open the door for contract renegotiation7.     
 
 In the tradition of ‘transaction costs’, Williamson (1975) and Klein et al (1978) argue 
that because of the impossibility of writing a complete contingent contract, the 
possibility of  opportunistic behaviour increases when the two parties in the contract 
are very different and neither can operate without each other.   In this case, the 
transaction cost approach to vertical integration minimises ex post bargaining 
inefficiencies arising from renegotiations.  
 
The question that follows is who has the upper hand when contracts are renegotiated?  
The ‘property rights’ approach emphasises  the importance of relation-specific assets 
and the extent that ownership structure affects the relative bargaining position of the 
two parties and hence, their relative ex ante incentives8.  In an environment of 
incomplete contracts, ownership of an asset is important because it provides residual 
rights to control ex-post contractual outcomes.  That is, ownership improves 
bargaining power and enhances the relative position during renegotiations9, 
attenuates the ‘hold-up’ problems10 and more importantly, influences agents’ 
incentives (See Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hart, 1995, 2003; Aghion et al, 
2006).  
 
In order to illustrate the above points, the principle underlying Hart et al’s (1997) 
example of privatisation of some prisons can be applied to the rail industry.  Society 
(represented by the government) wants public transport to be provided. Assume two 
                                                     
6 Tirole (1999:743) argues that “…there is unfortunately no clear definition of ‘incomplete 
contracting’ in the literature…incomplete contracts are usually preceded by an invocation of 
transaction costs.”  
7  Franchise renegotiations may include extending the franchise term or re-letting a franchise 
on new terms but also delays (and any amendment) in franchise termination should be 
considered as ‘implicit’ renegotiation.  
8  It is important to note that according to ‘transaction costs’, vertical integration provides 
positive investment incentives for both parties; while in the case of ‘property rights’, the party 
who owns the asset has an incentive to invest at the expense of the other party.  See Aghion et 
al (2006).   
9  This might not hold when parties share responsibilities in public (i.e. non rival and non 
excludable) good provisions.  Besley and Ghatak (2001) argued that although party A owns 
the project, its bargaining advantage is reduced because it cares about the outcome of the 
project and it cannot finish the project on its own.  Therefore, party A will be willing to 
transfer resources to party B and this has positive ex-ante investment incentives for party B. . 
10 Hold-ups problems among contractual parties happen when the parties share the surplus 
arising from their interaction and when one party making an investment does not receive the 
full benefit that should receive from such investment. 
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scenarios11:  a) the government owns the rail system and employs a manager to run it. 
b) The rail system is privately owned and the government contracts out the provision 
of public transport.   
 
‘Innovations’ by the manager can take the form of quality innovation to improve the 
rail service or cost cutting which has an adverse effect on quality of the service but 
staying within the boundaries of the contract.  Quality of the service is assumed 
difficult to identify, to measure and specify prior to the delivery of the service.  These 
‘innovations’ are not contractible ex ante and require ‘authorisation’.  If the 
government owns the rail system, there is little incentive for the manager to 
‘innovate’ because the government might ‘hold him up’ and give him a small share of 
the additional gains.  In contrast, ownership by the private contractor promotes 
quality innovation but this will not be introduced unless a new contract is written and 
the government (buyer of the service) agrees to pay a higher price for the 
improvement.  If so, the private contractor has to share the gains from quality 
improvement, and this decreases its incentive to improve quality.      Cost cutting 
requires no government approval so the government has to bear the cost of quality 
deterioration.  Therefore, the private contractor has more incentives to ‘innovate’ than 
the manager employed by the government.  “But, the private contractor’s incentive to 
engage in cost reduction is typically too strong since it ignores the adverse impact on 
quality” (Hart et al 1997:1129).    
 
Although performance bonds and termination clauses allow the franchisor to control 
opportunism on the part of the franchisees, it is not then possible to verify and 
monitor in detail the quality of the service.   Each TOC leases its rolling stock and 
pays (fixed and variable charges) for the use of the rail infrastructure.  Nonetheless 
these are largely fixed costs.  Given that the level of subsidies received or premiums 
paid is explicitly set in the contract, the TOC has a strong incentive to innovate via 
cost cutting (rather than quality improvement) to increase profits. According to 
Shaoul (2005), the main variable costs are wages and light maintenance of trains.  She 
agues that some TOCs have made substantial reductions in maintenance costs 
(cheaper suppliers, reduction in skilled staff, etc) with negative effects on the standard 
and reliability of the services.  That is, incomplete contracts cannot only lead to ‘ex 
post’ opportunism; but also to ‘ex ante' opportunism given that the franchises are 
normally awarded on the basis of the lowest subsidy (or highest premium) and the 
level of subsidy (or premium) is largely determined by the bidder.    
 
The choice between government and private ownership imposes trade-offs.  In 
contrast to government ownership, private ownership increases the possibility of 
‘quality-shading’ investment but it provides stronger investment incentives.  
 
These issues become more complex when we consider issues related to transfer of 
ownership, size of the investment, quality of service and enforcement of contracts. 
For example, if the size of the investment is large and ownership of assets lies with 
                                                     
11 The time line is as follows: at time 0, the government and the manager choose an 
ownership structure and write a contract; at time 1, the manger can invest or cut costs; at time 
2, service supplied if no renegotiation  or renegotiation given ‘innovations’ and realisation of 
ex ante uncertain state of the world. Also note that ‘ownership’ can also mean ‘right to use’ 
therefore, the example applies to franchise. 
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the private sector, then the contract might have to be ‘lengthy’ (in terms of time) to 
make it profitable.  But long-term contracts might restrict competition and make 
contracts less enforceable if breach of contract requires buy-back of the assets.  
Indeed,  Veljanousk (1989)  argued that franchising is less likely to be desirable when 
large capital investment has to be made since the duration of the franchises will have 
to be lengthy (e.g. 15 to 20 years) and  weaken the impetus  for  competitive re-
tendering.  
 
A related concern is the one of regulation.  From the agency perspective, Beales and 
Muris (1998) discuss how regulation might protect franchisees and franchisors from 
opportunistic behaviour and the problems that regulators encounter when identifying 
the ‘real’ reason for hold-ups or contract termination.  As highlighted by Newbery 
(2006), regulation becomes more important in the case of natural monopoly network 
utilities where private investors will not invest if they do not have an assurance that 
they can charge sufficiently high prices.  Note that these firms offer essential services 
required by all the population so price capping is one way to regulate private 
ownership and maintain competition under the presence of market power.  However, 
unnecessary regulation and overregulation is not desirable because regulation may be 
correlated to pressures from interest groups to redistribute rents rather than looking 
after the welfare of the consumers.   Yvrande-Billon and Menard (2005:678) warned 
of the dangers of imposing a mode of organisation on an industry by a regulator “with 
no or very little consideration for the transactions at stake”.  They noted that 
‘organisational mis-alignment’ can develop, not because of wrong choices made by 
companies but because exogenous choices are imposed on them that they can hardly 
change.  Furthermore, misalignments can also happen when an arrangement in which 
the characteristics of the mode of organisation adopted do not fit the attributes of the 
transaction it has to organise. Indeed, Joskow (2002) believes that this misalignment 
typically occurs when the ‘unbundling’ of former public utilities have not taken 
account of the characteristics of transactions between parties.       
 
2. Franchising of Train Operations  
 
A key part of the Railways Act 1993 was the franchising of train services. The UK 
government (DoT 92, para 21) was convinced that train service franchising would 
bring about “greater responsiveness to passenger needs, improved efficiency and 
better services…(and eventually the franchisees would)…make payments to the 
government.”  
 
The government developed the train operators franchising scheme from earlier 
proposals by Irvine (1987)  who believed franchising would bring competition into 
the market by the creation of ‘competitive tensions’ that would evolve from the 
contractual relationships of the train operators. Irvine argued that this resulting 
‘competitive tensions’ would lead to more efficient operations and greater market 
responsiveness. Murray (2005) also believed that the introduction of ‘competitive 
tensions' would lead to a superior privatisation method than the earlier privatisations 
of utilities. Many utilities were initially privatised as large monolithic suppliers that 
often failed to deliver a fully responsive market. In the long run, the government 
believed that state subsidies would be eliminated “…as franchises running profitable 
services would make payments to the government.” (See Jupe 2007: 83.) But critics 
of the government’s rail privatisation model came from Wolmar (2001, 2005) and 
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Terry (2001). Both argued that the UK rail privatisation process was financially 
wasteful, poorly conceived in organisation and was soon considered to be failing.  
Similarly, Crompton and Jupe (2006, 2003:397) strongly argued that the privatisation 
process was 
 
“[F]undamentally flawed’ because it produced an inefficient system with higher 
costs, poor quality of service and increased public subsidy.” 
 
In particular, Jupe (2005, 2007) showed that one of the major weaknesses in the 
franchising system was the track access charges. These charges formed the key 
contractual inter-face link between the train operators and Network Rail and were the 
key basis of the franchise contract12. In practice, difficulties such as infrastructure 
malfunctions by Network Rail gave rise to a complex and often contentious 
contractual compensation framework between the infrastructure provider and train 
operator.  Did malfunctions happen mainly because Network Rail underinvested or 
mainly because the TOCs were using very heavy/old rolling stock and hence placing 
too much pressure on the rails? In any case, malfunctions might be the consequences 
of underinvestment, strategic behaviour and quality ‘shading’ arising from the 
franchise. 
 
 Overall, Jupe (2005:190) concluded that the:       
   “franchise system in practice has not transferred substantial risks to the private 
sector or ensured as tight a control over costs as [the former state owned] British 
Rail achieved.” 
 
Preston et al (2000:99) conducted in-depth interviews with 38 potential bidders of 
train service franchises. They found that: 
 “…by far and away the most widely reported difficulty facing potential 
franchisees  was gaining an in-depth understanding of the franchise and gaining 
an understanding of the structural and regulatory regime that surrounds it.” 
 
         Criticism of train franchising also originated from the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), 
a state regulator specifically created to award and supervise train services. In 2001, 
soon after its formation, the SRA (2001:28) initially claimed that its responsibility for 
franchising would “provide a framework for delivery of the government’s ‘10 year 
Transport Plan13’” and the SRA’s priorities would be to deliver “more punctual and 
less crowded trains” and it would develop “more resilient rail operations.” But within 
two years, the tone of the regulator’s opinions had substantially changed. The chief 
executive of the SRA, Richard Bowker (SRA 2003/4: 6) subsequently highlighted the 
incomplete nature of the franchise agreements when he indicated that the franchised 
TOC model was “proving increasingly unworkable”. In particular, Bowker indicated 
that the terms of the franchises must be made clearer “about precisely what the TOCs 
are required to deliver.”  Bowker (SRA 2003:13), referring to the earlier railway 
disruption caused by the Hatfield rail crash, believed that the franchising model has 
“…proved unable to withstand the exogenous market shocks experienced in the last 
                                                     
12 Shaoul (2006) noted that ‘about 75% of the TOCs’ revenues went on ‘external’ purchases, 
mainly on TACs. 
13 In 2000, the UK government issued its plans for transport development in the UK for the 
following ten years (DETR 2000).  
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few years” such as the disruption to train services caused by the Hatfield train 
accident which resulted from poor maintenance of the track.  
 
As a result, the SRA (2003/4: 20) attempted to initiate “significant changes to the way 
it managed franchise contracts, embedding a forward looking business plan and risk 
based approach to ensuring delivery of franchise obligations”. In effect, these changes 
led to greater SRA control of the franchise specification of overall train operations 
and service levels. The SRA (2004/5: 27) believed that the most significant 
development of this change was in the way the “…TOCs approached the planning 
and delivery of their rail services.” However the SRA provided no feedback on how 
its ‘more involved approach’ to franchise management was working in subsequent 
years.  
 
In addition to criticism from the state regulator, the government itself was becoming 
increasingly concerned that franchising was not delivering the benefits it had initially 
expected. In particular, the government’s own ten-year Transport Plan for the 
country, (DETR, 2000) was critical of the limited benefits seemingly provided by the 
franchised TOC model. According to the Transport Plan, the major flaw of 
franchising was that long term planning and investment was inhibited largely because 
the franchises were often only held for a short 7 year period – which was considered 
too short to encourage investment in services and routes14 .Even more pointedly, 
James Sherwood, president of GNER’s parent company Sea Containers Ltd15 (which 
successfully tendered for the East Coast Main Line franchise) criticised the 
fragmented franchising method of train services because “…the cost of operating 
separate infrastructure and train companies is much higher…than if we had an 
integrated railway.”   
 
But there is a trade-off.  Integration of the railway system might be less costly in 
terms of subsidy but leads to monopoly whilst fragmentation, aimed to increase 
competition, cost more to the taxpayer given that the government cannot allow the 
system to collapse.   In any case, fragmentation and franchising has resulted in little 
competition.  As stated earlier, one company owns the rail infrastructure, three 
companies own the rolling stocks and “just three large transport groups either owing 
outright or holding more than 48% of shares in the operators of fourteen passenger 
rail franchises in the UK.  The franchising market has also attracted very few entrants 
in recent years…” (House of Commons Transport Committee, Passenger Rail 
Franchising, 14th Report of Session 2005/2006:26).  Train service competition was 
hindered because there were significant barriers to entry for new train operators.  
According to the House of Commons Transport Committee, these barriers were 
mainly related to a) the cost and complexity of bidding for a franchise and, b) the 
relatively new emphasis upon past performance in the evaluation of bids – which they 
believed was a handicap to companies that had not previously managed rail 
franchises. 
 
The Department for Transport (2004 White Paper) identified serious weaknesses in 
the key contractual inter-face relationship between the TOCs and Network Rail, the 
                                                     
14 See also Terry (2001) 
15 Reported in the Guardian newspaper, ‘Head of GNER calls for track and train integration,’ 
25 November 2004, p21. 
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infrastructure provider. In particular, DfT considered that the track charges (paid by 
the train operators) had “…little relation to the costs the companies impose on 
Network Rail.”  The effects of this distorted market were highlighted by the same 
House of Commons’ report, which concluded that there was:  
 
“…little evidence that competition has produced significant increases in 
innovation or improved the value for money for taxpayers and 
passengers…[and]…there is also little evidence that risk has been transferred 
from the public to the private sector.” (p.47) and ‘…[T]he reason for the lack of 
risk transfer is primarily because, at the end of the day, no Government can 
afford to let part of the railway system collapse. As a result, the Government 
and the taxpayer pay for a large part of the risk in the system.”  ( p.8)                          
 
This government attitude of ‘operator of last resort’ and the fact that TOCs do not 
need any substantial investment to operate the service explains why TOCs’ bids were 
as claimed by Shaoul (2006, 2005), to be ‘hopelessly optimistic’. Indeed, the House 
of Transport Committee also alleged that some operators were entering into very high 
premium contracts on the basis of very optimistic growth forecasts. The SRA had to 
increase subsidies over what was contractually agreed in the original franchise 
agreement (see SRA Strategic Plan 2003). For example, Connex South East (operated 
services from London to the south coast) had its franchise forfeited back to the SRA16 
because of persistent poor quality of service performance. However, Connex received 
additional subsidies of £58m in 2002 from the SRA because, in the words of the 
Transport Select Committee (2004:145), ‘they had got their numbers wrong’.  By 
2003, over a third of all the franchises had breeched the terms of their franchise and 
they were placed on a SRA management contract17.  
                                                                       
In the case of TACs, the Committee highlighted that the Government protected 
franchisees against increases in Network Rail’s track access charges for using the 
infrastructure “…by adjusting premiums or subsidies to take account of any changes 
in access charges.”  In effect, the TOCs were protected against any increases in the 
TACs permitted by the ORR and imposed by Network Rail. For example, in 2003, 
the ORR revised the TACs for 2004/9 by a 50% increase on ORR’s earlier levels set 
in 2000. Since the TOCs were protected against this increase, the state had to increase 
TOCs’ subsidies – resulting in the SRA scaling back the TOCs’ investment plans 
(SRA, 2003; Murray 2002). 
 
Note that problems arose not only because of TOC ‘protection’ but also because of 
weak contractual enforcement.  In particular, the National Audit Office18 (1996, 
                                                     
16 If a train company fails persistently to meet performance criteria under Section 30 of 
Transport Act 2000 the SRA can reacquire the franchise and directly operate train services as 
the operator of last resort. (See SRA Annual Report, 2003/4 p53.). 
17 This was a ‘cost plus’ agreement whereby the SRA took all fare revenue from a franchise 
but reimbursed the costs of the franchisee plus a ‘profit’ for the franchisee between 1%-2% of 
revenue (see also SRA, 2003: 47).  
18 The National Audit Office is independent of government and reports directly to Parliament. 
The NAO reports on the accounts of all government departments and a wide range of other 
public sector bodies. The NAO has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of departments and other bodies. [See  
http://www.nao.org.uk/about/index.htm] 
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2002) pointed out that the incentive regime that rewards (and penalises) good (and 
bad) punctuality is selectively applied and was not thought to be very effective.     
 
Overall, the franchising system and the fragmentation of ownership created little 
competition, introduces moral hazard and failed to provide the investment incentives 
to the detriment of passenger quality service and to the government exchequer funds.  
This fragmentation lends support to Bradshaw (1997) who believed that there will be 
little scope for ‘on rail’ competition between the TOCs, to Curwen (1997) who 
claimed that the (franchising) model was complex and expensive to set up and finally, 
to Nash (1997, 2002) who identified that many franchisees had built their franchise 
bids around bid reductions in operating costs and doubted whether the aim of 
reduction in subsidy was sustainable. 
 
 
3. GNER: A Case Study in Franchise Failure 
  
One of the larger TOCs winning the franchise for the major arterial route along the 
east coast of England was the Great North Eastern Railway Ltd. GNER had its origins 
as Inter City East Coast (ICEC) Ltd, incorporated on 9th June 1994 by the state-owned 
British Railways Board (BRB) in anticipation of later privatisation. Under the 1993 
Railways Act, the BRB vested the business assets and liabilities into ICEC Ltd on 1st 
April 199519. The share capital of InterCity East Coast Ltd was acquired by Great 
Northern Railway Ltd, (a subsidiary of Sea Containers UK Ltd20) from the state on 28 
April 1996 and on 22 October 1996, it changed its name to Great North Eastern 
Railway Ltd (GNER). 
 
The GNER franchise encompassed the operations of train services on the major 
London to Edinburgh route with other services to major urban conurbations such as 
Leeds and Newcastle. In being awarded the initial franchise, GNER successfully 
tendered to operate the service largely based on a subsidy profile.  
 
However, the first franchise’s results were distorted as a consequence of a major 
GNER derailment on the outskirts of London in October 2000. As a result, there were 
severe financial, operating and political implications not only for GNER but also for 
the whole UK rail industry. The cause of the accident was largely found to be neglect 
of the track by the infrastructure owner, Railtrack (and that of its maintenance 
contractor)21. The resulting railway operating restrictions placed upon the TOCs led 
to major distortion of GNER’s (and other TOCs) funding and revenue streams. The 
resulting legal and financial claims and compensation payments involving Railtrack 
                                                     
19 See p2, Directors Report and Accounts, ICEC Ltd 1996. 
20 In turn, Sea Containers UK Ltd was a wholly owned subsidiary of Bermuda based, Sea 
Containers Ltd. 
21 The resulting operating and funding difficulties of Railtrack in improving the track quality 
standards of the network led to widespread national rail disruption for train operating 
companies in general and GNER in particular. The subsequent costs for the railway industry 
were severe. The train services of many TOCs were massively disrupted while urgent 
engineering checks were implemented. See Hatfield Derailment Report, ORR, 24 July 2006 
ORR/21/06:  http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.8190. As a result of this 
disruption caused by the Hatfield accident, Shaoul (2006:156) noted that over “…£591m was 
paid in penalties and compensation to the TOCs for late and cancelled services.” 
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and the SRA were substantial, unanticipated and outside the remit of the franchises’ 
terms. As a result, many of the profiles of subsidy receipts (and premium payments) 
were revised22.  
 
A particularly relevant issue is the extent to which the GNER franchise provided 
incentives to encourage Network Rail23 (and formerly Railtrack) to undertake quality 
investment. Since Network Rail sets track charges (taking into account that its return 
is regulated by the rail regulator), changes in track charges to GNER are ultimately 
paid by taxpayers through increase subsidies24. When innovation/quality is not 
contractable ex ante, Network Rail lacks incentive to invest because once the 
investment is made, negotiations over the division of the benefits lead to a sharing of 
the benefit enhancement made possible by Network Rail investment.    Nevertheless, 
Network Rail has a stronger incentive to cut costs with adverse consequences on 
quality.  Wolmer (2005) argued that Railtrack concentrated in maximising profits and 
sharing dividends at the expense of investing in assets and safety.  He claims that 
Railtrack had no incentive to ensure that the track could cope with additional traffic 
and that not only Railtrack did not buy enough rails but “no-one was in charge of the 
wheel interface” (p. 174)    
 
3.2. Performance 
 
Table 1 shows that during the first year of its private sector status (1996/7) to the last 
financial year of the first franchise (2004/5), GNER had a declining annual subsidy 
from £49.82m in 1996/7 to £3.09m in 2001/2. Although the franchise continued three 
more years, in 2004/5 little or no subsidy (or premium) was received (or paid). The 
first full length 12 month accounting period, commencing in 1997/8, highlights 
GNER’s annual revenue of £323.68m with an operating profit of £13.25m (after 
including a £57.77m subsidy.) By 2002/3, revenue has grown by 32.6% reaching 
£410.45m – with operating profits reaching a peak of £57.88m and with negligible 
subsidy levels.    
 
Analysing this increase in earnings is difficult because of the on-going legal set-offs 
after Hatfield and the lack of disaggregated data in the published financial statements. 
Undoubtedly, over this period GNER benefited from a general increase in national 
passenger traffic experienced throughout the whole network  Besides this,  Shaoul 
(2005) argues that  TOCs benefited  as well from  ‘revenue protections’ (ensuring 
passengers paid full tickets for their journeys) and increase in some unregulated fares 
(e.g. supersavers, unrestricted train tickets) above inflation level.  Costs for usage of 
track access and rolling stock were higher than before privatisation but subsidies 
where also higher.  She claims that “...most of the external costs are largely fixed, 
                                                     
22 In the case of some TOCs, the disruption to train services was so acute that the SRA had to 
step in with financial support to allow some TOCs to continue trading e.g. Central Trains, 
Greater Anglia, etc.  See Wolmar (2005). 
23 Furthermore, the above interpretation might also help to explain why Network Rail was 
created to acquire Railtrack.  Network Rail is a company limited by guarantee, with no 
shareholders and accountable directly to their members (drawn from the railway industry, the 
public and the Department of Transport) and regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation. 
24  If the rail regulator allows Network Rail to increase the TACs paid by a TOC after 
contracts are signed – the government (DfT) will indemnify the TOC.  
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management sought to contain labour and maintenance costs in order to generate a 
surplus.” (p.27) 
 
In the final two years of the first franchise, revenue increased by 4.5% in 2003/4 and 
by another 10.8% in 2004/5. But although revenue increased, corresponding 
operating profits declined from a peak of £57.88m in 2002/3 to £45.03m in 2003/4 
and £19.88m in 2004/5 – an earnings decline of 67% over 2002/3 to 2004/5 period – 
when virtually no direct subsidies or premiums were involved.  
 
With respect to dividends, over the period of the first franchise, GNER made total 
distributions to Sea Containers UK Ltd, its parent company of £146.6m, amounting to 
virtually all of its net earnings over this financial time period. 
 
Extension to First Franchise 
 
Pending the second re-tendering process, the SRA generously granted GNER a 2-year 
extension to its franchise from April 2003. Although it was initially planned for 
GNER to pay a premium payment of £25.145m and £70.26m in 2003/4 and 2004/5 
these explicit terms were dropped by the government25. Instead, GNER agreed to pay 
for some minor station and infrastructure enhancements, improve both customer 
compensation and ‘customer satisfaction regimes’ refurbish some passenger rolling 
stock and increase driver recruitment. It was estimated by the government that these 
changes would amount to ‘some £100m.’ However there are no published figures to 
support to what extent, if any, these improvements were implemented. The 
government did not explain why GNER’s premium payments were substituted by a 
‘commitment’ to improve investment in its services. Previously, in GNER’s case, as 
with other franchised train operators, investment in services was a business and 
revenue generation an issue for the TOCs themselves (and not related to any franchise 
agreement to pay premiums or receive subsidies.)  
  
Second Franchise 
 
In March 2005, the SRA (Annual Report and Accounts 2005: 2) signed a new 
franchised agreement for 7 years from 1st May 2005 with automatic renewal for a 
further three years subject to meeting ‘certain performance targets.’ The franchise 
was awarded to GNER after successfully competing with a Virgin Stagecoach 
consortium, Danish Railways and First Group.[Some press reports stated that GNER 
had paid more than £300m than its nearest competitor for the franchise but, for 
reasons of ‘commercial confidentiality’, the DfT has not released the precise figures 
(see Robinson, 2006).    
 
The second franchise awarded to GNER marks a shift in attitude of the SRA to many 
of the TOCs.  The earlier franchises were often characterised by a large number of 
TOCs receiving subsidies which proved to be very expensive for government 
funding26.  As a result, in the second round of franchisees, the government move to 
an increased use of premium based franchises.  But this   was tempered by the 
                                                     
25 See DfT Press Release dated 16 January 2002 ‘Two year extension agreed - £100m private 
sector investment committed.’ 
26 By 2004 the overall annual subsidy to TOCs had reached £2bn instead of gradually 
declining to £800m as envisaged at the time of privatisation (Wolmar, 2005). 
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inclusion of more ‘cap and collar’ contractual arrangements whereby the government 
would take a share of any losses incurred or profits made – if the a TOC’s financial 
results fell outside specified  levels.  
 
Within this new trend, the key feature of the second franchise was the high level of 
GNER’s premium payments (see table 2), which implied a substantial and sustained 
growth in passenger traffic flows needed to generate increased cash flows that were 
necessary to meet this increased obligation to the government.  
   
Compared with the last year of its first franchise and the first year of its second 
franchise27, revenue only increased from £475.4m to £477.7m, growth of only 0.5%. 
At the same time, the company was required to commence premium payments28 of 
£52.7m leading to operating profits falling from £19.88m to £7.24m. 
 
Under its franchise terms, GNER was generously protected from substantial risk to its 
income stream after the first four years by the disproportionate sharing of risk with 
the government if revenue is significantly below target. For example, Perren (2005: 
30 ) noted that after 2009, ‘…if revenues are less than 84% of target the deficit is then 
shared 20% to GNER and 80% to the government but between 94% - 98% it is shared 
equally’ which creates potential moral hazard problems.  
 
The financial position of GNER reflected poor growth in passenger revenue, the 
introduction of substantial premium payments and GNER’s parent company 
extracting considerable reserves from the company in the form of dividends. In 
particular, from passenger revenues of £427m, GNER reported an operating profit of 
only £7.2m. 
 
In the previous year, GNER had a passenger revenue stream of £423.5m and an 
operating profit of £19.9m. In spite of predictions of revenue growth of nearly 10% in 
its franchise tender, GNER increased revenue only negligibly. In addition, GNER was 
now required to pay a premium of £33.35m over the full financial year 2006/7. 
GNER (Annual Accounts 2006:7) was also experiencing falling liquidity levels and 
the appearance of net current liabilities in the 2006 balance sheet. By 7 January 2006, 
the last balance sheet produced by GNER before its collapse later in that year, 
showed the company had very few assets remaining in its balance sheet.  Net assets 
fell from £27.4m in 2005 to £5.45m in 2006 largely as a result of the company 
extinguishing its previously accumulated revenue reserves by paying a sizeable total 
distribution of £35.74m back to its parent company. 
 
However, by August 2006 (before GNER had even filed its 2006 financial 
statements29) Sea Containers UK Ltd admitted30 that ‘GNER has underperformed the 
financial projections in its franchise plan because fewer passengers are travelling than 
                                                     
27 No financial statements were produced in the year of GNER’s collapse i.e. in 2006/7. 
28 Premium payments are included as part of operating expenditure and are not separately 
disclosed in GNER’s published accounts. (In this case, DfT sources of premium payments are 
used: see Table 2.)   
29 Under UK legislation, private limited companies with no direct overseas holdings have 10 
months after their year-end to file their financial statements which are then assessable by the 
public. GNER’s accounts were not filed until nearly the end of this ten month period. 
30 See Daily Telegraph, London, 12 August 2006. 
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estimated in the bid.’ In a Press Release31, Sea Containers stated that GNER’s 
passenger revenue was only a third of the growth as forecast32.  In particular, in 
GNER’s franchise bid, it was optimistically assumed that passenger revenue would 
amount to £510m which implied a 9.9% increase in revenue (over the fourteen month 
period May 1 2005 to June 30 2006), compared with the same period in 2004/5. But 
in practice, passenger revenue was only 3.3% higher.  
 
Explaining GNER’s Demise  
 
So seemingly determined were GNER to re-win the franchise that Christopher 
Garnett, the chief executive who bid for the second franchise (but who resigned from 
GNER in August 2006) indicated33 that he “… would rather over-bid and win than 
under bid and lose.” A few months later, Bob MacKenzie, chief executive of Sea 
Containers was reported34 as saying that GNER “…could not cope with the £1.3bn 
premium that it had to pay the (UK) Treasury.”  He rather simplistically indicated that 
GNER’s revenue projections were just too ‘optimistic’. In spite of the generous risk 
sharing agreement incorporated in the revised franchise between GNER and the DfT, 
the first year results provide sufficiently strong evidence that GNER would be unable 
to meet future premium obligations. 
 
Within months of the commencement of the second franchise, in September 2006, the 
former chief executive, Christopher Garnett admitted35 that “GNER was no longer 
sustainable…the (profit) margins are too slender...[T]he market will self-destruct, as 
bidders win on ever-tighter margins.”  
 
When GNER ran into financial difficulties, and although the government was 
formally unwilling to renegotiate the terms of the franchise, the government did so in 
practice. 
Sea Containers had lodged a performance bond36 with the DfT of £15.3m (which 
would rise to £28.7m in May 2007) in case GNER was unable to comply with its 
franchise terms, the DfT agreed to waive this requirement. In December 2006 when 
Sea Containers decided it could not continue operating the franchise, the DfT, (as the 
‘operator of last resort’) agreed to waive this bond, provided the parent company 
agreed to ‘co-operate’ in running the service (on behalf of the government on a ‘cost-
plus’ management contract) until new franchise bidders37 could be sought (See DfT 
2006).  
                                                     
31 Press release: ‘Sea Containers provides up date on financial condition and on GNER’s 
operating performance’, Hamilton, Bermuda, August 11, 2006. 
32 Ford (May 2005) noted that for GNER to achieve its revenue targets, an average load factor 
of 83% was assumed - a figure that Wolmar (2006) also described as ‘very ambitious targets.’ 
33 See: Friedli D. (2005), ‘Fighting to Stay on Track.’  The Scotsman newspaper, 27 March.   
34 ‘Sea Containers to ditch GNER in May’, Sunday Times Business News dated 22 October 
2006.  
35 On 26 September 2006, The Times, London – ‘GNER no longer sustainable…’ 
36 In addition, it was also a franchise condition that GNER has ‘in place a £30m standby 
credit facility during the term of the franchise, callable by GNER in the need of liquidity.’ 
This standby credit was provided by Sea Containers.  GNER was also required to have £10m 
overdraft facility, guaranteed by Sea Containers to provide additional working capital if 
needed’ (see Sea Containers Ltd news release, 11 August 2006, para 2/3. pp10-11).  
37 See http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/passenger/franchises/icecf1/competitioncommences 
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However, neither Sea Containers nor the government appeared to accept that inherent 
flaws in the franchising process as being the reason for GNER’s collapse. Many of 
the reasons put forward by Sea Containers for GNER’s demise are not fully justified. 
Rather than highlighting the substantial increase in its premium payments under the 
renewed franchise as a major source of GNER’s difficulties, Sea Containers 
attempted to justify the financial problems of GNER by blaming ‘the disproportionate 
effect’ of falling revenues resulting from the 2005 summer terrorist bombings in 
London.  
 
Sea Containers claimed that more than half of the passenger revenue losses resulted 
from passengers not travelling to London as a consequence of ‘the focus of terrorist 
activity around Kings Cross38 station in London.’ In particular, Sea Containers (News 
Release August 11 2006, see also Railway Magazine 2006) admitted that it had failed 
to meet its 9.9% increase in passenger loadings and only rose by 3.3% resulting in a 
£33m loss of revenue. The primary cause was attributed to a loss of passenger traffic 
as a result of the July 7th 2005 London terrorist bombings which accounted ‘for just 
more than half of the shortfall.’ 
 
 However, GNER’s claim is not explicitly supported by publicly available passenger 
traffic flows. Although the rail passenger statistics do not identify specific train 
operators, national travel statistics (ORR, 2006: 13) disclosed that the number of 
passenger journeys nationally in the UK did fall by 3.3% in the second quarter of the 
year (that included the London bombings) from 270 million journeys in the first 
quarter39 to 261 million journeys. However, in previous years there has normally 
been a drop between Quarter 1 and Quarter 2. [e.g. In 2004, the equivalent fall was 
2.8% and in 2003 it was 2.8%.] Significantly, in the following quarter (after the 
bombings) national passenger journeys actually increased by 8.8% compared with a 
comparable increase of 5.4% in 2004 and 4% in 2003.   
 
Ford (2007: 20-21) was particularly critical of the level of GNER’s passenger mileage 
over the existence of both of its franchises. He noted that between 1993/94 and 
2005/6, although passenger numbers increased by 70%, total passenger miles 
increased from 1.895bn miles to 2.566bn miles – an increase of only 33% over 12 
years. 
 
Sea Containers also blamed a weakening in the UK’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
and ‘improvement in Network Rail’s performance’ (which implied less compensation 
payments for delays cause by infrastructure failures.) However, the UK had 
experienced substantial growth in its GDP40 growth rate in the previous 12 quarters. 
Since the second quarter of 2005, the UK’s GDP has increased from an annualised 
1.6% to reach nearly 3% in the last quarter of 2006 (reaching the highest level since 
the second quarter in 2004.)  
 
Additionally, the ‘unforeseen improvement’ in Network Rail’s performance should 
not have come as a surprise to GNER, given that NR had an intensive investment 
                                                     
38 London Kings Cross station was the only London terminus railway station for GNER. 
39 Quarter 1 commenced in April; the bombings happened at the start of Quarter 2 in July. 
40 See: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=192
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programme since the Hatfield accident highlighted under-investment in  its 
infrastructure. For example, NR’s Annual Report (2005:2) claimed that  performance 
has seen “…accelerating improvements in the performance and efficiency of the rail 
infrastructure….and (that) substantial improvement has been made…[and]…a large 
number of initiatives have contributed to this notable improvement.”  
 
Furthermore, GNER sought to apportion blame for their demise on the threat of more 
competition. At the start of its second franchise period, GNER became involved in a 
dispute with the rail regulator about allowing Grand Central Ltd, a recently formed 
‘open access’ TOC to operate a limited amount41 of train services on a proportion of 
the main rail line used by the majority of GNER’s train services. Under the 1993 
Railway Act, so-called ‘open access’ train operators could apply to the ORR to 
operate a limited service (on a previously awarded franchised route) to ‘fill-in’ spare 
capacity in the infrastructure by only paying for track infrastructure access on a 
marginal cost basis. In 2005, Grand Central asked the ORR for permission to operate 
a limited open access service from Middlesbrough (in the North East of England) to 
London. Under the financial procedures of revenue allocation, passengers with full 
price (non-discounted) tickets could use any operator’s train services that over-lapped 
on the same route.  GNER objected to Grand Central’s proposed services because a 
proportion of its revenue would be abstracted42 by Grand Central. This ‘open access’ 
was a potential threat (in theory) to all franchised train operators but GNER still 
proceeded with bidding for its second East Coast Main Line (ECML) franchise. 
Indeed, the possibility of ‘open access’ competition was always a threat to GNER 
since 2002 when GB Railways Ltd first operated Hull Trains43 on part of the ECML. 
Additionally, and according to Wolmar (2005), a year before GNER signed their 
renewed franchise, Grand Central unsuccessfully attempted to operate another limited 
service in 2004 from Newcastle to Manchester which would have also used part of 
the same track as GNER. Indeed, a letter44 from the DfT explicitly warned that 
potential “…bidders should take into account the rights and aspirations of…open 
access and other operators regarding the use of available paths in the timetable.”  
  
In spite of the ‘open access’ threat, the government was initially confident that GNER 
would meet its passenger revenue targets.  GNER attempted to justify the high level 
of its second franchise bid by referring to the government’s support for its franchise 
revenue projections. GNER referred to an earlier statement by Alistair Darling who 
stressed that45:  
                                                     
41 Grand Central applied to operate only three return service a day from London to North East 
England. See letter from DfT dated 17 January 2006. Correspondence relating to the track 
access applications by Grand Central and GNER published on  6 April 2006. 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_foi/documents/page/dft_foi_611502.pdf 
42 Revenue abstraction could occur under the ORCATS computerised revenue allocation 
system whereby full priced and season ticket revenue was allocated between competing 
companies serving the same stations in proportion to the number of seats available. 
43 GB Railways Ltd (trading as Hull Trains) operated a limited open access service between 
London and Hull and used spare capacity of the ECML infrastructure – which was 
predominantly used by GNER. 
44 Letter dated 10 May 2006, released under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 from the 
DfT. [Alistair Darling was Secretary of State for Transport.] 
45 Alistair Darling, Secretary of State for Transport. [Comment from a debate in the House of 
Commons on 19 December 2006 referring to this earlier quote by Alistair Darling.] 
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“…the government has [previously] crawled all over the GNER figures in the 
last few weeks to make sure they stood up. They do, and we will deliver them 
by carrying more passengers.” 
 
On 15 December 2006, against a background of several weeks of press speculation, 
the DfT announced46 that the government would not be renegotiating new terms for 
GNER’s second franchise. 
 
The (new) Secretary of State for Transport, Douglas Alexander said that:  
“the government has made it clear that rail operators that fall into financial 
difficulty should expect to surrender the franchise and not receive financial 
support. To do otherwise could set the precedent that we are willing to bail out 
operators at extra cost to the tax payer.” 
 
Until the DfT could re-tender the franchise, the DfT generously agreed that GNER 
would continue to operate the service for the next 12 to 18 months under a 
‘management agreement’ whereby GNER’s revenue and costs passed to the 
government in return for the payment of a management fee.  Rather than Sea 
Containers forfeiting their performance bond for unilaterally terminating their 
franchise, the government permitted the bond forfeiture to be waived if Sea 
Containers assisted the government in the retendering process to find GNER’s 
successor. In effect, notwithstanding the existence of a performance bond, the 
franchisee has in effect considerable power if it threatens to withdraw unilaterally its 
committemtent to its franchise. Immediate termination and total withdrawal from its 
franchisee would have substantial train operating consequences for the government 
and passenger traffic. As the ‘operator of last resort’, under these circumstances, 
delays would be incurred before the government could replace the failed operator. 
  
In particular, in an agreement with the government, GNER would only be required  to 
forfeit its performance bond if it ceased services earlier than the management 
agreement specifies and, as an incentive for GNER to assist in co-operating in 
providing services whilst a replacement was found, it would also receive ‘an 
incentive payment’ if (unspecified) targets are exceeded. 
 
 Moreover, rather than blaming  the flawed franchise for the GNER’s failure,  the 
government specifically attributed responsibility to GNER’s ultimate parent 
company, Sea Containers Ltd which itself was in financial difficulties. On 16th 
October 2006, Sea Containers announced47 that it was applying for Chapter 11 
(insolvency) protection in the US. 
 
The rail minister, Mr Harris seemingly believed48, at least in public, that Sea 
Containers’ 
                                                     
46 DfT Press Release ‘Competition commences for operator of Intercity East Coast franchise' 
15 December 2006. See: 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/passenger/franchises/icecf1/competitioncommences] 
47 See Press Release dated 6 October 2006, ‘Sea Container LTD files for Chapter 11’ at  
http://www.seacontainers.com/dynamic/body.asp?DocumentID=665 
48 In response to a question in the House of Commons by from Mr Christopher Grayling MP 
on 19 December 2006. See: 
 20
“… bid was easily achievable …and …[T]he reason why the franchise had to be 
pulled was entirely due to problems with GNER’s parent company, Sea 
Containers, and not to problems with the franchise.”   
 
But this was not even a view shared by GNER’s ultimate US parent company, Sea 
Containers Ltd. The parent company49  was adamant that since the funding of GNER 
was ‘ring fenced’, the financial difficulties faced by itself would have no bearing on 
GNER’s financial position. Sea Containers Ltd had never provided GNER with any 
significant or meaningful financial support – apart from underwriting a performance 
bond. Sea Containers was adamant in its press release that the “control and operations 
of GNER…are not affected by the (US) Chapter 11 filings….GNER’s lines of credit 
and financial activities have been ring fenced from those of Sea Containers…”. 
Indeed, rather than not providing funding, Sea Containers actually extracted over 
£155m in total from dividends from both of GNER’s franchises. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
The House of Commons Transport Committee Annual Report 2007 (para 30) 
recognised the costs involved in the failure of the ECML franchise.  The Transport 
Committee indicated, on GNER’s demise, that:  
 
“there is nothing to celebrate. The costs of severing the franchising agreement 
and re-letting it so soon effectively represents wasted expenditure as there are 
no tangible benefits to the travelling public. Improvements and upgrades to 
services on the East Coast Main Line are now suspended…passengers are 
missing out as a result. This is not good value for money.” 
 
In many ways, the demise of GNER’s second franchise within the space of only 
eighteen months into a ten year period typifies many of the structural, organisational 
and financial failures of the UK’s government’s attempts to privatise the country’s 
railway industry. The failure of GNER was particularly pointed on two accounts: 
firstly, the franchise was issued on one of the country’s leading ‘flagship’ railway 
routes, and secondly, this was the first major franchise to fail in the second cycle of 
franchise retendering.  
 
The first round of the franchisees granted initially on privatisation was predominantly 
noted for their emphasis on government subsidy receipts (in varying amounts) 
throughout nearly all of the TOCs. And even with these relatively high subsidy levels, 
some TOCs had significant and growing operating problems and increasingly fragile 
cash flow difficulties. Some TOCs were financially rescued after the Hatfield 
accident and others were operated on a management (or cost plus) basis. In the 
second round of franchises (when the original franchises came up for renewal), the 
whole relationship of TOCs and the government had changed. Some TOCs, such as 
GNER, appeared so determined to regain and continue with (what they have come to 
regard) as ‘their’ franchises that unreasonably high and untenable bids were made – 
based on highly optimistic and undeliverable revenue and passenger targets. 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061219/debtext/61219-
0002.htm 
49 Sea Containers News Release, 6 October 2006:‘Sea Container LTD files for Chapter 11’ at  
http://www.seacontainers.com/dynamic/body.asp?DocumentID=665 
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In effect, substantial over-optimism of both revenue and cost assumptions in order to 
obtain the franchise has led to the (unfeasibly) high level of premium payment that 
GNER contracted to pay the government - further distorted by the unbalanced risk 
sharing between GNER and the government. In this case, unforeseen events and 
asymmetric information has led to ineffective and failed renegotiation and, ultimately, 
at a high cost to taxpayers. 
 
 Most TOCs were virtually ‘shell companies’ – with their only significant asset being 
their franchise. Apart from the loss of a relatively small performance bond (which, in 
effect, was even waived in GNER’s case) the financial risk and penalties (from 
overbidding and subsequently and unilaterally terminating the franchise) are 
generally extremely low. The TOCs also incurred substantial ‘sunk’ costs in 
preparing their bids. It is reported50 that it cost each bidder between £3-£5m to tender 
for a franchise, and with the SRA incurring total costs of £40.7m on franchise 
replacements and extensions over 2001-04. In addition, it was estimated, that with the 
inclusion of the DfT costs, that the total combined cost of awarding a franchise with 
just three bidders to be between £11.5m and £17.5m.  
 
The contractual requirements concerning the financial arrangements and structure of 
the TOCs also ranged from weak to non-existence. In GNER’s case, apart from the 
specification of minimum liquidity levels, the contract was generally silent on 
financing and funding arrangements. Specifically, there was no requirement for any 
profits to be retained in the TOC. Virtually all of GNER’s earnings over both its 
franchises were distributed as dividends, amounting to £155m that was returned to the 
parent company, Sea Containers. The franchise made no explicit provision for these 
distributions to be restricted if Sea Containers’ profitability or liquidity levels fell. 
Indeed, in the final year before GNER’s collapse, virtually all of its revenue reserves 
were distributed back to the parent company. 
 
GNER’s demise typifies the inherent difficulties involved in the franchising process. 
GNER predominantly attributed its failure to unforeseen increased costs and an 
unplanned fall in passenger revenue – but this was not generally evidenced by 
examples from other train operators. Additionally, the impact of the London 
bombings in 2005 initially led to a revenue drop in the case of some operators in the 
immediate aftermath but not on the scale GNER claimed. GNER also referred to the 
threat of ‘open access’ competitors abstracting revenue – even though Grand Central 
planned to operate only three return daily services from London to the North of 
England and, even then, these services were not planned to start until late 2007 - 
nearly one year after GNER decided it could not continue with its franchise. 
 
The UK government has preferred not to point the finger of blame for GNER’s failure 
at its rail franchise model. Rather it has inappropriately attempted to deflect 
responsibility for GNER’s demise to the financial difficulties of its ultimate parent 
company, the Bermuda based, Sea Containers Ltd.  
 
                                                     
50  House of Commons Transport Committee, Passenger Rail Franchising, 14th report of 
session 2005-2006, p22. 
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The demise of GNER’s second franchise so early after its commencement illustrates   
how franchisees have  largely fail  to deliver on their commitments because   they are 
poorly designed and co-ordinated, have inconsistent objectives and reflect the 
problems of dealing with a fragmented and dysfunctional privatised rail industry. 
 
The failing of the franchised method for train operations goes beyond the need of 
designing a coherent long term development plan.  By the nature of their very 
complex and unwoven business,  railway networks seem to operate more efficiency 
and effectively when they are not privately  disassembled and do not operate as 
separate components involving a myriad of contractual relations between many 
parties to the industry. This paper has shown that franchising of train services which 
was, a major aspect of the UK government’s rail privatisation process, and typified by 
the fate of GNER, has failed to provide the benefits envisaged in the government’s 
initial intentions. By drawing on the finding of this paper, a sound basis is provided 
on which further research can be conducted into other (perhaps more effective and 
efficient) methods of establishing and operating railway systems as well as examining  
and comparing the experiences of other European countries.  
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Table 1: GNER Financial Performance 
 
Financial year 
ending  
Revenue 
(£m) 
Operating Profit 
(Loss) after subsidy 
or premium (£m)  
Subsidy(Premium)1
(£m) 
 
Dividends
(£m) 
 
FIRST FRANCHISE 
31 March 1995/6 278.768 15.341 84.24 - 
1996/7 
8 months to 4th Jan  
230.574 (5.831) 49.82 Nil 
1997/8 
3rd Jan 
323.682 13.246 57.77 - 
1998/9 
9th  January 
356.528 13.116 42.37 10 
1999/2000 
8th January 
371.879 7.934 21.76 
Subject to dispute 
5 
2000/012
6th January 
385.539 26.19 
 
8.87 4.2 
2001/2 
5th January 
369.392 28.38 3.09 
Subject to dispute3 
35.2 
 
2002/3 
4th January 
410,450 57.88 0.629* 45.5 
2003/4 
3rd January 
429.083 45.03 NIL5 19.8 
2004/5 
8th January 
475.402 19.881 NIL 26.9 
SECOND FRANCHISE 
2005/6 
7th Jan 
477.69 7.24 (52.72) £8.844
 
2006/2007 
No financial statements: 
Franchise ended Dec 2006 
 (35.35)  
 
Source: Published financial statements of GNER, 1995-2006. 
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 Notes to Table 1: 
1 The SRA reports different figures for subsidies and premiums in some years. (See SRA 
Annual Report 2005 pp148-9 for subsidy/premium profile.)   The reported figures in GNER’s 
accounts differ, in part, because of some legal set-offs and other compensation/penalty 
receipts and payments. Additionally, some of the figures in the SRA accounts have not been 
finalised and some were later recalled because of errors. Other reasons for differences include 
offset provisions for legal claims and counter claims, compensation settlements, payments, 
and penalties for meeting or failing to meet performance standards.   
 
2 On 17 October 2000, a GNER train derailed at Hatfield. GNER’s Annual Report 2000/1, p2,  
noted “…following this incident Railtrack plc imposed a number of speed restrictions on the 
UK rail network resulting in the cancellation of services, extended delays and significant 
timetable adjustments.” An amount of £23.5m has been received from Railtrack’s contractual 
arrangements and, as a result of “business interruption insurance, £17.025m has been credited 
as insurance receivable.” 
 
3 After the Hatfield accident, GNER was involved in a dispute with Railtrack and the SRA 
relating to compensation claims. The premium figures given are from the SRA figures. Sea 
Containers (Press release 7 May 2004) reported that eventually GNER settled for US$20.7m 
and, in return, paid the SRA in full settlement of the counter claims. 
The published financial statements of GNER show some differences from these SRA figures. 
In their published financial statements of 2003/4, it is reported (p10-11) that the GNER has 
made ‘several substantial claims against Network Rail…various insurers and other parties 
involved.’ GNER also states it has withheld ‘payment of certain Network Rail Infrastructure 
Services Ltd’s invoices during 2001 and 2002.’ As a result of a complex legal settlement in 
December 2003 ‘…GNER and NRIS Ltd reached agreement settling all GNER’s claims 
arising out of Hatfield incident and relieving GNER from any obligation to repay amounts 
previously withheld…’. However, the SRA counterclaimed by claiming a financial interest in 
the compensation of £25m. The financial statements do not identify the premium payments in 
these specific years. The premium payments have been netted off against legal compensation 
packages. 
 
4 As a result of FRS21 (and the adoption of IFRs in 2005), UK financial statements do not 
now show proposed dividends – the adjusted total (paid) dividend is £35.74m. However, the 
2005/6 accounts were restated as a result of only showing dividends paid. A dividend of 
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£26.9m was declared on 29 April 2005 in respect of the 53 weeks ended January 2005 and 
dividends of £8.84m have been declared and paid in respect of the 52 weeks ending 7 January 
2006. The total dividend of £35.74m was included in the 2006 accounts on restatement and 
then the 2005 dividend was removed. Over the combined two years, in cash flow terms, the 
total amount of dividends paid was not affected.  
 
5. Although no direct subsidy or premiums were received or paid in 2003/4 and 2004/5, as a 
condition of the terms of its two year franchise extension, GNER agreed to spend £100m ‘on 
rebuild, more reliable and longer trains, modernised stations and new car parks.’ [See: 
Memorandum by the GNER (ref: For115) to Select Committee on Transport, 11th May 2005, 
para 1.5.] 
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Table 2.      
GNER’s Second Franchise Premium Profile. 
                                                                                          (£m)  
 
2005/6 (52.75) 
2006/7 Franchise terminated in December 2006 (35.35) 
2007/8 (81.39) 
2008/9 (114.02) 
2009/10 (164.29) 
2010/11 (207.86) 
2011/12 (250.81) 
2012/13 (294.41) 
2013/14 (343.52) 
2014/15 (396.21) 
TOTAL (2005/6 – 2014/15) (1.940.41) 
[Discounted total1 = £1.277bn.] 
 
Source:   
The above premium payments are from the DfT following a request to the DfT under 
Freedom of Information Act 2000.  
[See publicly available letter dated 10 March 2005: www.dft.gov.uk] 
 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
1 Discounted at 6.1%, (see Sea Containers News Release August 11, 2006, para 3b, p12). The 
NPV was calculated using the government’s discount rate of 6.1%. [Note: On a discounted 
basis, (from 2005 to 2015) this total premium of £1.94bn, on a net present value basis, 
amounted to £1.277bn.] 
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